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Abstract 
 
In 2001, the Fed has lowered interest rates in a series of cuts, starting from 6.5 % at the end of 
2000 to 2.0 % by early November.  This paper asks, whether the Federal Reserve Bank has 
been surprising the markets, taking as given the conventional view about the effect of 
monetary policy shocks.  New econometric techniques turn out to be particularly suitable for 
answering this question: this paper can be viewed as a  showcase and case study for their 
application.  In order to concentrate on the Greenspan period, a vector autoregression is fitted 
to US data, starting in 1986 and ending in September 2001.  Monetary policy shocks are 
identified, using the new sign restriction methodology of Uhlig (1999), imposing the 
"conventional view" that contractionary policy shocks lead to a rise in interest rates and 
declines in nonborrowed reserves, prices and output.  We find that neither the Fed policy 
choices in 2001 nor those of 2000 were surprising.  We provide a method to "explain" these 
interest rate movements by decomposing them into their sources.  Finally, we argue that 
constant-interest-rate projections like those popular at many central banks are of limited 
informational value, can be highly misleading, and should instead be replaced by on-the-
equilibrium-path projections.   
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Introduction 
 
In 2001, the Fed has lowered interest rates in a series of cuts, starting from 6.5 % at the end of 
2000 to 2.0 % by early November.  This paper asks, whether the Fed has been surprising the 
markets, taking as given the conventional view about the effect of monetary policy shocks.  
Questions like these frequently arise in practice: it is the task of academics to provide the 
means for answering them.  This is the purpose of the paper, treating the particular time 
episode of 2001 as a case study for how monetary policy can be analyzed and understood, 
using recent tools from time series analysis. Included in our data set as the last month is 
September 2001, and thus the attack on the New York World Trade Center. 
 
We start by fitting a vector autoregression to the data.  Excellent surveys about this 
methodology and their application to monetary policy are provided by Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) or Favero (2001):  there is no 
need to to provide an additional overview here. We restrict attention to data from 1986 to 
present: 15 years of data should be enough to figure out the ''policy rule'' of the Greenspan 
period.  We define surprises as innovations to that policy rule, i.e. as surprise movements in, 
say, the Federal Funds Rate which cannot be viewed as a systematic reaction to past or other 
present data.   
 
The difficulty lies in appropriately identifying the monetary policy shock.  When using data 
for the Greenspan area alone rather than for a longer time period, many conventional 
identification procedures yield impulse responses which are not clearly consistent with a 
conventional view of the effects of monetary policy.  One way to resolve this issue is to 
simply conclude that the conventional view is incorrect or not worry about lack of 
significance.  But those that favor the conventional view might not be convinced by estimates 
of the size of the policy shocks obtained this way, fearing that something else but monetary 
policy shocks have been identified.  Instead, they would demand an approach which delivers 
results consistent with the conventional view.   
 
This is done in this paper, using the new sign restriction methodology of Uhlig (1999). The 
technique is closely related to the approach by Faust (1998) or Canova and de Nicolo (2000). 
The "conventional view" that contractionary policy shocks lead to a rise in interest rates and 
declines in nonborrowed reserves, prices and output, is directly used for identifying the 
monetary policy shocks per imposition of sign restrictions on the impulse responses.  
 
It will then be shown that neither the Fed decisions in 2001 nor in 2000 are surprising, but 
should instead properly be viewed as systematic reactions to developments elsewhere in the 
economy.  This is followed by a decomposition of the interest rate moves into parts explained 
by innovations in other time series: we provide a methodology for performing this 
decomposition.   
 
Finally, we present an analysis, comparing the actual time series behavior to a projection, in 
which it is assumed that the Fed had kept interest rates unchanged at the beginning of 2001.  
This type of exercise is now popular at many central banks.  However, this exercise 
effectively assumes hugely counterfactual errors.  For this reason and the reason that off-
equilibrium behavior is artificially constrained in these exercises, I argue that these kinds of 
projections offer limited insight, can be highly misleading, and should be replaced by "on-the-
equilibrium-path" projections instead.   
 
Some of the results in this paper, using a somewhat shorter data set, have been used in the 
MECB 3 Update report, see Alesina et al (2001).   
  
 
Fed Activism 
 
During the first eleven months of 2001 and following a fairly steep upward movement of 
interest rates in 2000, the Federal Reserve Bank has drastically cut the Federal Funds Rate 
from 6.5 percent to 2.0.  By comparison, the ECB has roughly followed the movements of the 
Federal Reserve with a lag of 4 to 5 months during this episode.   
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Looking at this picture and recalling the casual newspaper evidence, one may get the 
impression that this drastic series of cuts was rather surprising and unexpected.  Was it?  Did 
the Federal Reserve surprise the markets  in 2001?  Or were these cuts simply the usual, 
systematic response to developments elsewhere in the economy? 
 
To answer that question, one needs to make it more precise.  In particular, one needs to clarify 
the meaning of the word "surprising" in this context.  One can probably not expect to predict 
this sequence of interest rate cuts based on data up to, say, November 2000 alone: in that 
obvious sense, these cuts were surprising.  More interesting, however, is to think about 
monetary policy surprises, as other data about the economy keeps coming in, and to ask, 
whether Alan Greenspan has reacted any differently in the year 2001 to that data than in the 
past.  The following decomposition is therefore standard in the VAR literature.   
 
Taking the Federal Funds Rate tr  as the monetary policy instrument, consider a policy rule of 
the form 
 
ttttt yyzfr ε+= −− ,...),,( 21  
 
where ty  is data at date t, tz  are surprises to these data in the economy other than monetary 
policy surprises, and tε  are the monetary policy surprises. The function ,...),,( 21 −− ttt yyzf  is 
the systematic reaction of monetary policy to past and present data.  We call monetary policy 
unsurprising, if  tε =0.  If monetary policy is unsurprising, then the failure to predict choices 
for the Federal Funds Rate are entirely a consequence of failing to predict developments 
elsewhere in the economy, to which monetary policy reacts in a systematic way. 
 
We wish to understand whether the tε 's were sizeable or not during 2001.  One can make this 
formal, using the approach in Leeper and Zha (2001): as we shall see, this is hardly necessary 
in this context. 
 
A VAR perspective 
 
To provide an answer, we use a vector autoregression, using a set of variables commonly used 
in this literature.  Monthly data on the log of the Federal Funds Rate [FEDFUNDS], CPI 
inflation (calculated as the difference between logs of the data [CPIAUCSL] at date t and t-
12), the log of oil prices [OILPRICE], the log of nonborrowed reserves [BOGNONBR], the 
log of M1 [M1SL], the log of real GDP [GDP96] ("interpolated" to obtain monthly data, by 
predicting its monthly growth, using INDPRO and CPIAUCSL as regressors) and the log of 
real personal consumption expenditure [PCENDC96] has been obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Web Site, with the names in square brackets indicating the label of 
the series used, and undertaking the indicated transformation.  E.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum 
and Evans (1999) or Bernanke and Mihov (1998) have used the commodity price index rather 
than oil prices and generally do not include real personal consumption expenditure.  We have 
included it here because of its known predictive powers for output, see Cochrane (1994).  For 
an additional set of results, the log of the cumulated returns on the SP 500 under dividend 
reinvestment [ TRSP500 ] has been added and indicated in the description below.  Note that 
all variables have been used in log-levels, only the log-CPI has been differenced in order to 
obtain inflation.  In particular, we have taken logarithms in particular of the Federal Funds 
Rate in order to avoid negative territory in some of the projections below.  
 
The data has been restricted to start in January 1986 in order to concentrate on the Greenspan 
era: with now 15 years of data, it should in principle be possible to "calculate" his policy rule 
reasonably precisely.  The data stops in September 2001: this was the most recent data 
available when the results were calculated in November 2001. I.e., the month with the 
terrorist attack on the New York World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001 is the last 
month of the data set.  As time passes,  the results here offer the advantage of hindsight in 
evaluating some of the projections. 
 
Write the vector autoregression as 
 
)()1()()( tutYLBctY +−+=  
 
where Y(t) is the data vector, c is the vector of constants, B(L) is a finite-order matrix lag 
polynomial and u(t) is the one-step ahead prediction error with some variance-covariance 
matrix Σ.  
 
The key is now in identifying the monetary policy shock. What needs to be done is to find a 
column vector a  of some matrix A with Σ='AA , which satisfies suitable identifying 
restrictions.  The column vector a  is then a monetary policy shock one standard-deviation in 
size, which we shall call the monetary policy impulse vector.  Its entries provide us with the 
within-month reaction of all variables to a monetary policy surprise, one standard deviation in 
size. Replacing u(t) with a  in the VAR above, impulse responses to a monetary policy shock 
one standard deviation in size can be calculated. 
 
Identifying the monetary policy impulse vector turns out to be particularly tricky for the 
Greenspan area.  Standard identification exercises often deliver results, which stand in 
contrast to the conventional wisdom, that a surprise tightening of monetary policy leads to a 
reduction in output, a reduction in prices and a reduction in nonborrowed reserves. 
 
One such example can be seen in the next plot (calculated using RATS), where a Cholesky 
decomposition has been used, with the Federal Funds Rate ordered last.  The response to the 
Federal Funds Rate, i.e., the last column, is sometimes used to identify a restrictive monetary 
policy shock.  As one can see, this generates a price puzzle (comp. Sims, 1992): CPI inflation 
moves up, rather than down in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock. 
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One way to resolve this issue is to simply conclude that the conventional view is incorrect or, 
at least, that not much should be read into the inflation response, because it may be 
insignificant.  E.g., one can certainly provide sensible reasons for why one might think that 
prices should initially rise rather than fall, following a surprise rise in interest rates.  But those 
that favor the conventional view may not be convinced by estimates of the size of the policy 
shocks obtained this way, fearing that something else might have been identified instead.  
Rather, they would demand an approach which delivers results consistent with the 
conventional view.  What is needed is an approach that can answer questions about monetary 
policy shocks, taking the conventional view as given. 
 
We therefore discard the VAR results above, and propose an alternative method for 
identifying monetary policy shocks. 
 
A new approach: sign restrictions. 
 
For the results to follow, we shall use the new sign restriction methodology of Uhlig (1999): 
Canova and de Nicolo (2000) or Faust (1998) offer a similar approach.  The "conventional 
view", that contractionary policy shocks lead to a rise in interest rates and declines in 
nonborrowed reserves, prices and output, is used directly for identifying monetary policy 
shocks.  Put differently, the conventional view is supported "per construction".  This is a tool 
one should use with caution: the approach applied in this way says nothing about whether the 
conventional wisdom is correct in the first place.  In fact, Uhlig (1999) has shown that 
monetary policy shocks, identified via the effect of raising interest rates, lowering 
nonborrowed reserves and lowering inflation, have no clear effects on output, see also Sims 
and Zha (1998). For the purpose here, we feel comfortable with imposing that restriction 
however: after all, we wish to learn something about monetary policy shocks, taking the 
conventional view as given.   
 
More precisely, the identifying restrictions are placed on the impulse response functions by 
requiring that 
 
i) the response of the Federal Funds Rate does not fall below zero during the first 12 
months (i.e. month 0 to 11) following the shock, 
 
ii) the response of CPI inflation, nonborrowed reserves and real GDP does not rise 
above zero during the first 12 months following the shock.   
 
When adding the log of the stock market, the same identification restrictions have been used, 
i.e., the impulse response of the stock market has not been restricted. 
 
It has become common in many structural VARs to impose that prices or inflation rates do not 
react within the period to monetary policy shocks.  Imposing this restriction here poses no 
technical difficulty.  But whereas zero restrictions of this type are of essence in structural 
VARs, they should only be imposed here if they are truly part of the conventional wisdom: 
this clearly is a matter of judgement.  We have chosen not to impose it, in light of the 
evidence, that many prices are changed at very high frequency, such as weekend sales prices 
in supermarkets or prices for airline tickets.  I.e., we cannot be sure that prices do not react 
instantaneously, and leave it up to the data to inform us. 
 
A Bayesian vector autoregression with 6 lags and a constant has been fitted to the data, using 
a Normal-Wishart prior, described in Uhlig (1999): suffice it to say that it is a very weak prior 
and permits stationary, unit and explosive roots.  Bayesian methods for VARs and their policy 
applications are developed in greater detail in Sims and Zha (1998), and their more 
sophisticated approach can be combined with the approach here.  We have elected to proceed 
with the Normal-Wishart prior because of its simplicity. 
 
The estimation proceeds by taking many draws from the posterior for the VAR coefficients 
B(L) (eliminating those with roots above 1.01) as well as many draws on the space of possible 
impulse vectors. Keeping only those joint draws, in which the sign restrictions for the impulse 
responses are satisfied, error bands etc. can be calculated.  Shown are always the 16% and 
84% (point-by-point) quantiles.  More details are in Uhlig (1999). 
 
Impulse Response Functions 
 
Before looking for the monetary policy shocks in the data, we argue that these shocks are the 
ones we should indeed be looking for, as they have the "desired" conventional consequences. 
 
The following graphs show the impulse response for the monetary policy shock only as it is 
the only shock we have identified.  The VAR has been estimated on the basis of data from 
January 1986 to (and including) November 2000.  The vertical lines in the graphs for the 
Federal Funds Rate, nonborrowed reserves, CPI inflation and real GDP show until which 
point the impulse responses have been restricted to be of the appropriate sign.  While the log 
of the Federal Funds Rate has been used for estimating the VAR, the impulse response shown 
here is twice: first, as percentage of its current level or the level deviation of its logarithm 
(log-FFR) and second, as the more commonly used level response in percent interest (level-
FFR): to convert the former into the latter, we have assumed a "base" level for the Federal 
Funds Rate of 5 percent. 
 
They all look fairly reasonable.  Obviously, where the sign restrictions have been imposed, 
the impulse responses are "forced" to look reasonable: in particular, the price puzzle is 
avoided by construction.  Note that it is hard to find a negative effect on consumption, despite 
the fact that the reaction of output has been restricted to be negative.  This could be consistent 
with an interpretation, that monetary policy shocks generate offsetting wealth- and 
substitution effects. Note also, that inflation appears to react within the period to a monetary 
policy shock with this identification. 
 
Also note the scale.  A one-standard-deviation monetary policy shock adds about 4 to 10 basis 
points to a Federal Funds Rate of 5%: this clearly is not much.  This already shows that 
monetary policy shocks have been only at most a minor explanation of the movements of the 
Federal Funds Rate during the Greenspan years.  Consequently, also the reaction of real 
output and inflation is small and comparable in size to the movement in the Federal Funds 
Rate.  The reaction of real GDP actually looks a bit large, given the small movement in the 
Federal Funds Rate.  We have imposed here the conventional view, that real GDP reacts 
negatively to a monetary policy surprise: either the reaction is strong, because these types of 
surprises are rare, or, alternatively, the reaction of real GDP shown here and in the graphs 
below should be considered an "upper bound" of what might be reasonable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
Eliminating the surprises and on-the-equilibrium-
path projections 
 
Having identified the monetary policy surprises, we can now eliminate them from the data.  
More precisely, we compare two scenarios.  In the first, we are using the actual data until (and 
including) September 2001, and projections beyond that, taking draws for future interest rate 
changes and changes in other variables based on the estimated VAR data generating process.  
The second scenario differs from the first in that we "subtract" the monetary policy surprises 
in December 2000 until September 2001 from the data, during which interest rates fell from 
6.5% to 3%.  We start the simulations in December 2000 rather than January 2001, because 
we are using the FEDFUNDS series from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: that series is 
an average of daily figures rather than the Federal Funds target rates prominently announced 
in newspapers.  It takes the maximal value of 6.51 in November 2000 compared to the slightly 
lower value of 6.40 in December 2000.  The cleanest exercise therefore is to do the 
counterfactual simulations starting in the first months of the turnaround in interest rates,  i.e. 
already in December 2000, rather than taking the data of December as given and risking an 
extrapolation of an admittedly small, initial decrease.  
 
Subtracting these surprises means to eliminate its effects on all current and future data. I.e., 
recalculate the data with 
 
)()1()()( tvtYLBctY +−+=  
 
where 
 
)()()( tatutv ε−=  
 
for December 2000 until September 2001 in the second scenario, with a the estimated 
monetary policy impulse vector and )(tε the estimated monetary policy shock.  Let its 
variance be 2eσ  .  From October 2001 onwards, )(tv is drawn from the Normal distribution 
)',0( 2eaaN σ−Σ  for the second scenario, i.e. without monetary policy shocks, and from 
),0( ΣN  for the first scenario, i.e. including monetary policy shocks. 
 
These are on-the-equilibrium-path projections: what is assumed is that the systematic way the 
central bank reacts to past news remains unchanged, i.e. that policy is unchanged (except at 
most for reducing the variance of the policy shocks to zero).  Note that unchanged policy 
implies changes in interest rates. 
  
In the next graph, we show our results.  The solid line is the first scenario, using actual data, 
whereas the second scenario is shown with black dashed lines.  There is uncertainty in the 
estimates of the VAR coefficients and the monetary policy impulse vector for the second 
scenario in December 2000 through September 2001, and there is additional uncertainty 
regarding )(tv  after that point: for that reason, we show the 16% and 86% quantile. 
 
 
 
We only show the graph for the Federal Funds Rate as it already tells the entire story: the 
differences between these two scenarios is surprisingly small.  Extrapolating past behaviour 
leads to predicting a sequence of interest rate cuts almost just as much as the ones that have 
taken place already, at most at a slightly slower speed. In sum, the sequence of dramatic cuts 
we have seen, actually turn out to be unsurprising, given shocks elsewhere in the economy not 
due to monetary policy.  
 
This is the key message of this paper: the cuts seen throughout 2001 are cuts that should be 
viewed as the usual, systematic reaction of the Greenspan monetary policy to past and present 
developments in the economy.   
 
The confidence band for interest rates under both scenarios includes very low interest rates 
around 1 percent starting somewhere towards the beginning of 2002.  We do not want to 
imply that Japanese conditions will take hold in the US (but we also do not want to rule them 
out either): we merely note that extrapolating the past behaviour of this system of variables, 
and simulating forward, using historical measures of uncertainty, and based on the currently 
low and falling interest rates in the US, the calculations will tell us that extremely low interest 
rates may be a serious possibilitity in the near future.  
 
For comparison, we present the same exercise, but where we have used data only up to March 
2001, during which interest rates were decreased from 6.5% to 5.3%. This exercise predicts a 
level somewhere between 2.5% and 4% in October 2001, including the actual level of 2.5% at 
the lower bound of the central (84%-16%)=68% probability band without appealing the 
special circumstances of September 11th.   Thus, the cut in interest rates were not only 
nonsurprising and systematic responses to developments elsewhere in the economy: they were 
even predictable as of March 2001. 
  
 
 
What about the rise in interest rates in 2000? 
 
If the cuts in 2001 were not surprising, perhaps, the rising rates in 2000 were. We have 
therefore redone the exercise above, starting the simulations in January 2000.  To do this, the 
VAR and thus the reaction function for the Federal Reserve has been estimated on the basis of 
data until December 1999 alone: so if there was a change in policy, it would show up in these 
graphs.  
 
The next figure shows, that the no-surprise path is rather similar to the actual data path.  
Again, we conclude that the actions of the Federal Reserve Bank have been far less surprising 
than they occasionally have been claimed to be in the popular press, and instead are 
systematic reactions to developments taking place elsewhere in the economy. 
 
 
 
 
The components of the rise in interest rates in 2000 and the fall in 
2001 
 
The projections above track the actual developments of the Federal Funds Rate pretty well, 
explaining it as the systematic reaction of the Federal Reserve Bank to past data.  So, what, 
exactly, did the Federal Reserve Rate react to?  Why first the rise and then the fall in interest 
rates in 2000 and 2001?  A more detailed look provides the answer.   
 
More precisely, in order to decompose the movements in the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) into 
its responses to other variables plus the monetary policy shock, begin by writing the VAR 
equation for the log Federal Funds Rate (lFFR) as 
 
)()()1()()( ttvtYLBctlFFR lFFRlFFR εβ ++−+=  
 
where lFFRc  is the constant in the equation for )(tlFFR in the VAR, )(LBlFFR  is the row vector 
in B(L) for the lFFR equation, )(tε  is the monetary policy shock and )(tv  is that part of u(t) 
not explained by the monetary policy shock (see above) with β  its coefficient vector in the 
lFFR equation.  I.e., the one-step ahead prediction error )(tulFFR  for the Federal Funds Rate 
has been decomposed into 
 
)()()( ttvtulFFR εβ +=  
 
The decomposition is now done as follows.  Suppose one wants to know the "influence" of 
present and past GDP on the present lFFR: call that lFFR:GDP(t).  To that end, find the 
coefficients in )(LBlFFR  on the lags of the log of GDP - call that )(: LB GDPlFFR  - and likewise, 
take the entry in β  and )(tv  due to GDP, 
 
)()1()()(: : tvtGDPLBtGDPlFFR GDPGDPGDPlFFR β+−=  
 
)(tvGDP  is the one-step ahead prediction error in GDP subtracting that part which is due to the 
monetary policy shock.  It does not have a structural interpretation other than "not monetary 
policy shock".  Furthermore, the entries of )(tv  will generally be correlated.  One could 
proceed a step further and attempt a full structural decomposition of )(tv  in e.g. supply and 
demand shocks etc.: there are a variety of ways in which this could be accomplished.  We 
have not proceeded down this path of structural identification, since our main aim is to 
summarize the available data with a minimalist set of additional identifying assumptions: 
none (other than identifying the monetary policy shock) are necessary here.  Further below we 
will examine the fraction of interest rate movements due to e.g. )(tvGDP  as well as the 
consumption prediction error and interpret this as the movements of interest rate choices due 
to real variables.  This can be viewed either in the narrow sense of a decomposition, or be 
given a more meaningful economic interpretation: while the origin of these one-step ahead 
prediction error in GDP and consumption may not be due to structural shocks to the real 
economy, it may well be that the Federal Reserve is reacting to the effect of that shock on 
GDP and consumption.  With the caveat in mind, that there are several other observationally 
equivalent interpretations, this benchmark view may nonetheless be useful for reading the 
graphs shown below. 
 
What is particularly relevant is the revision in this influence since December 1999, i.e. 
 
)12:1999(:)(:)(: GDPlFFRtGDPlFFRtGDPlFFR −=∆  
 
Finally, to calculate the influence )(: tGDPFFR∆  on the change in the level of the Federal 
Funds Rate compared to December 1999, calculate 
 
( ) )12:1999()(:)12:1999(exp
)12:1999(:)(:
)(:
FFRtGDPlFFRlFFR
GDPFFRtGDPFFR
tGDPFFR
−∆+=
−=
∆
 
 
Note that FFR:GDP(t) and thereby also this revision contains current shocks through 
)(tvGDPGDPβ .  One should therefore expect it to be quite erratic.  One should also expect serial 
correlation through the lagged effects )1()(: −tGDPLB GDPlFFR . 
 
Uncertainty in the estimation arises from the uncertainty about the lag-coefficients B(L) and 
the resulting uncertainty about the constructed u(t) as well as uncertainty about the identified 
monetary impulse vector a  and therefore uncertainty about the decomposition of u(t) into 
)(taε  and )(tv  as well as the coefficient vector β . 
 
Summing over )(: tXFFR∆ for several variables X , one calculate the influence of a group of 
variables rather than a single variable on the Federal Funds Rate: this is what is shown in the 
graphs below.  We have grouped the other variables in three groups.  The first group contains 
price variables, i.e. CPI inflation and oil prices.  The second group contains monetary 
variables, namely M1 and nonborrowed reserves.  The third group contains the real variables, 
i.e. real output and real consumption.   
 
More precisely, in order to calculate e.g. the joint effect of real output and real consumption 
on the Federal Funds Rate, we calculate 
 
( ) )12:1999()(:)(:)12:1999(exp
)(:
FFRtClFFRtGDPlFFRlFFR
trealFFR
−∆+∆+=
∆
 
 
For the effect of past FFRs on current values, we have calculated 
 
)1()()(: : −= tlFFRLBtlFFRlFFR lFFRlFFR  
 
and then shown 
 ( )12:1999(:)(:)12:1999(exp lFFRlFFRtlFFRlFFRlFFR −+  
 
so as to start it off from the original level of the data in December 1999.   
 
This is what we now examine first. I.e., the first graph compares the benchmark simulations 
of actual data until September 2001 and simulated data beyond that to that part of the Federal 
Funds Rate, which can be explained solely by the reaction of that interest rate to its actual 
own past, given by the benchmark simulations.  The benchmark simulations are the black 
dash-doted lines, whereas the part that just shows the reaction to its own past is given by the 
solid lines.  There is some coefficient uncertainty as to how that reaction function looks like: 
the two solid lines show the lower and upper bound.  Before September 2001, the degree of 
uncertainty is apparently pretty small. The uncertainty rises after September 2001 because 
now, the benchmark projections are no longer a single line of data but a range of possibilities 
too. 
 
 
 
At a first glance, the black and the solid lines coincide pretty well, and one might be tempted 
to conclude that the interest rates dance to their own music: they go up, because they go up, 
and they go down, because they go down.  Obviously, that wouldn't be much of an 
explanation.  For a more appropriate analysis, one needs to recognize that interest rates 
typically do not change radically: last months Federal Funds Rate will typically be a 
reasonably good predictor for the Federal Funds Rate this month, if nothing else is known.  
This is what we see in the graphs: it almost looks as if the solid lines have been obtained from 
the dash-dotted lines by shifting them to the right by one month. 
.  
 
What is more interesting is why the dash-dotted line is different from the solid line, i.e., how 
it gets pushed around compared to the simple random walk forecast.  To that end, we need to 
look at the dependence of the Federal Funds Rate on the other variables.  This is done in the 
following graphs, which essentially decompose the difference between the solid lines and the 
black dash-dotted lines in the graph above.  What is shown is, how the Federal Funds Rate 
moves due to lagged and contemporaneous movements of other variables, using the 
calculations explained previously.  Note that for the contemporaneous movements of the other 
variables, we have included only that part, which is not due to monetary policy surprises, 
otherwise we would just see the uninteresting echo reaction of the Federal Funds Rate to its 
own, autonomous movements.  The latter isn't particularly large anyhow, as we have already 
shown above. 
 
 
 
  
 
A couple of things are noticeable.  First, the degree of uncertainty, i.e. the difference between 
the solid lines, seems to have risen now.  The differences are actually of similar scale to the 
differences between the solid lines in the own-lags graph above, but they appear to be larger, 
because we are now seeking to decompose the fairly small difference between the benchmark 
Federal Funds Rate scenario to the reaction to its own lags in the own-lags graph. Notice that 
the scale of the figures, i.e., the movements of interest rates explained here, is much smaller 
than in the graph above.  Second, the movements appear to be somewhat erratic.  But that is 
just due to the fact that new information about the economy arrives each month, to which the 
Federal Reserve reacts in systematic ways. 
 
Now, a story behind the interest rate changes emerges from the data analysis.  The price 
component shows, that the interest rate changes were not driven by inflation surprises 
directly: there is as much room above the no-change line at zero as there is below.  Instead, 
the second plot shows that there was some additional upward pressure on interest rates of 
between 10 and 20 basis points in 2000 via monetary variables, turning to a more neutral to 
negative pressure in 2001. The sudden widening of the bounds for the influence of the 
monetary policy variables is due to simulating the data from October 2001 onwards and due 
to the jump upwards in nonborrowed reserves in September 2001, as the following plot 
reveals. 
 
 
 
Further, the third plot shows that there was some additional upward pressure on interest rates 
from real variables at the very beginning in 2001, but mostly downward pressure ever since of 
somewhere between -10 and -30 basis points.  These pressures from monetary and real 
variables may have inflationary consequences, about which the Fed might have ultimately 
been concerned about: whether this is so or whether the Fed is reacting for other reasons to 
these news cannot be deduced from the graphs. 
 
A reaction of 10 to 30 basis points up or down compared to the starting level in 2000 may not 
seem much.  But it actually is: these rather small differences suffice to explain the difference 
between the benchmark Federal Funds Rate scenario to the reaction to its own lags in the 
own-lags graph.  I.e., combine these small differences with the persistent nature of the Federal 
Funds Rate, and you get an explanation of the rather large rise in interest rates in 2000 and the 
rather large fall in 2001. 
 
Does the stock market play a role in all of this?  So far, we have left it out of the estimation 
entirely.  One can add a stock market variable - we have chosen cumulated returns based on 
the SP 500 plus reinvested dividends - and see, how large a component might be explained a 
reassessment here.  This is done in the next two graphs.  The first shows the impulse response: 
it has a reasonable shape.  The next shows the component due to the stock market. 
 
 
 
 
 
According to this plot, the stock market has consistently put downward pressure on the 
Federal Funds Rate throughout 2000 and 2001, contrary to the perception, that the rise in 
2000 was undertaken in order to kill the stock price bubble.  It actually started to provide 
upward pressure towards the second half of 2001, with the very last numbers coming from the 
simulations.  The total influence is e.g. smaller than the influence of the real variables, 
though. 
 
In sum, the story which this data analysis has to offer, is this.  Interest rates rose substantially 
in 2000 because of the boom conditions at the beginning of 2000 and the pressure from 
monetary variables such as M1 and nonborrowed reserves.  They fell again in 2001, largely 
because of worsening economic conditions. The Fed reacted to these developments in its 
usual, systematic way.  The stock market played at most a minor role. 
 
A "projection" based on constant interest rates. 
 
An exercise currently popular at many central bank is to calculate the effects of leaving 
interest rates unchanged.  I.e., one may ask: what would have happened, if Greenspan had not 
cut interest rates in a sequence of steps in 2001, but instead, had left the Federal Reserve Rate 
at its 6.5% December 2000 level?  We can answer this question using the same tools as above 
and again comparing two scenarios.  In the first, we are using the actual data until March 
2001, and projections beyond that, taking draws for future interest rate changes and changes 
in other variables based on historical uncertainty.  The second scenario differs from the first in 
that we keep the Federal Reserve Rate constant at 6.5%.  More precisely, we have picked a 
sequence of monetary policy surprises )(~ tε  in such a way as to imply a constant interest rate. 
 
The results for the Federal Funds Rate, CPI inflation and for the percent change of real GDP 
compared to December 2000 are in the following graphs.  The solid bands are the 16% and 
84% confidence bands for the first scenario, whereas the dashed, black lines are the 
corresponding confidence bands for the second. The vertical line denotes the start of the 
projections, noting that we additionally used actual data until and including March 2001 for 
the first scenario: for this exercise, we have used the March 2001 rather than the September 
2001 cutoff because it makes it easier to visually compare the uncertainty in the forecast to 
the deviation from the actual path implied by a constant-interest-rate scenario. Obviously, 
there is no uncertainty regarding the Federal Funds Rate in the second scenario. 
 
Compare in particular the figure for the Federal Funds Rate to the corresponding figure in the 
previous "on-the-equilibrium-path" comparison of scenarios for 2001.  There the difference 
between the two was small.  That implies, that the surprises which one needs to assume here, 
are several standard deviations away from zero, i.e. they are dramatically and unrealistically 
large. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
A reading of these results would be as follows.  CPI inflation is predicted to fall under both 
scenarios: in fact, at constant interest rates, inflation would have entered deflationary territory 
rather quickly.  In order to avoid a serious and deep inflation, interest rates need to be cut. 
 
Furthermore, the following observation is important. Assuming, as we have done here, that 
monetary policy shocks have the ability to influence GDP, continued GDP growth will be 
much smoother under the given policy than under the alternative of constant interest rates.  
The confidence bands at the end of 2003 are much tighter, assuming actual policy and 
simulated policy, using the past as a guide from April 2001 onwards, than with the constant 
interest rate policy under scenario two.  This is all the more interesting as the simulation under 
the first scenario actually contains more uncertainty as to what interest rates will do.  But 
there is plausible reason for the smoother behaviour of GDP in the first scenario:  in essence, 
as future uncertainty unfolds, the Federal Reserve is allowed to react to changing 
circumstances in the that scenario, keeping GDP growth on track, while it is prevented from 
doing so in the second, thus having to rely on luck alone.   Whether the Federal Reserve is 
truly able to influence GDP growth to the extent shown here is a topic of intense debate.  One 
should view the shown differences between the two scenarios as the upper bound on what is 
possible.  In the other extreme, some researchers claim that the Federal Reserve has 
practically no effect on real GDP, see in particular Uhlig (1999).  In that case, it won't matter 
much for GDP which scenario we are in.  The results for the Federal Reserve rate and CPI 
inflation should still hold, though. 
 
We have performed a similar counterfactual analysis for the interest hike in 2000, for 
comparison to the results obtained previously.  The first three graphs show the result as to 
what would have happened, had the Federal Reserve Bank chosen a sequence of monetary 
policy surprises so as to keep the Federal Funds Rate at its December 1999 level.  As one can 
see, CPI inflation and output growth would have been initially strong, then turning into a 
steep recession and a steep deflation, compared to actual data. 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
How useful are these projections?    The results show that unchanged interest rates are 
dramatically far from anything the Federal Reserve might have been considering.  One could 
attempt to show this more formally, using e.g. the two-standard-deviation criterion of Leeper- 
Zha (2001), but that a constant interest rate scenariowould have been extremely unlikely 
should already be evident enough.  The constant-interest-rate projections above can be used 
for drawing the policy conclusions, that interest rates should not remain at 6.5% for 2001 and 
2002 because otherwise the US might experience a deflation of up to minus 10%.  This is like 
saying that when driving a car, one should not follow a straight line for another mile or two, 
after the road has taken a turn.  While that is certainly correct advice, the informational 
content is obviously limited, although perhaps, some policy makers might find them useful in 
order to see the dramatic impact that bad monetary policy can have.   
 
Some interpret a no-change-in-interest-rates projection as reflecting a no-change-in-policy 
scenario.  The opposite is true: if there is no change in policy, everybody expects interest rates 
to be changing.  If instead interest rates would not change, agents have two choices: they can 
either interpret them as a highly unlikely sequence of dramatically large policy shocks.  This 
is the interpretation one needs to keep in mind for interpreting the VAR results above.  
Alternatively, agents can interpret these deviations as a clear signal that the underlying policy 
has changed.  How agents would react to that is largely unpredictable.  This is true, even 
when using a fully spelled out model: the range of outcomes of subgame perfect equilibria is 
huge.  For an excellent exposition on this topic, see e.g. Sargent (1999) or Ljungqvist-Sargent 
(2000), chapter 16.   
 
Thus, to interpret the no-change-in-interest-rates projection requires considerable mental 
discipline and awareness that these projections actually show a dramatic change in policy, 
interpreted by agents as a highly unlikely sequence of dramatically large policy shocks.  
Given that these projections are mainly used as communication tools by central banks to a 
public largely unaware of these caveats, the results can be highly misleading. 
 
The alternative is clear.  We have provided an analysis based on a no-shocks-to-policy 
scenario further above.  This is the kind of on-the-equilibrium-path analysis which is 
internally consistent, easy to communicate to the public.  Further, it contains information 
about the likely future paths of interest rates, which is a far more interesting piece of 
information than telling the public to possibly expect -10 % deflation, if interest rates had not 
been changed after December 1999 for two years. 
 
Data Revisions. 
 
Finally, we note that GDP figures have been under continuous revision, possibly giving 
additional reason for the actions by the Federal Reserve.  Data revisions have been singled out 
to be an important explanation for monetary policy in the early 1970s by Orphanides (2001).  
This may have been a factor in 2001 as well.  The following plot compares the data for real 
GDP (GDP96), taken from the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis web site in May 2001 to the 
data in November 2001: what is shown is the difference between the new and the old data in 
percent of the new data.  As one can see, real GDP is judged to be lower now by one percent 
compared to the previous figures, with most of the "revisional decline" being attributed to the 
year 1999.  Standard Taylor rule estimates would imply that these revisions have been 
responsible for an additional 50 basis point cut.  Data revisions have not been incorporated in 
the VAR exercise above. 
 
 
 
Conclusions. 
 
In 2001, the Fed has lowered interest rates in a series of cuts, starting from 6.5 % at the end of 
2000 to 2.0 % by early November.  This paper asks, whether the Federal Reserve Bank has 
been surprising the markets.  The paper thus uses these events as a showcase and case study 
for the application of some recent econometric techniques useful for answering the question.  
In order to concentrate on the Greenspan period, a vector autoregression is fitted to US data, 
starting in 1986 and ending in March 2001.  Monetary policy shocks are identified, using a 
new sign restriction methodology of Uhlig (1999), imposing the "conventional view" that 
contractionary policy shocks lead to a rise in interest rates and declines in nonborrowed 
reserves, prices and output.   
 
We compare two on-the-equilibrium-path projections for the Federal Funds Rate, setting the 
policy shocks to zero in one scenario and allowing actual or simulated shocks in the second.  
We find that these scenarios differ very little.  This demonstrates that neither the Fed policy 
choices in 2001 nor those of 2000 were surprising, but that they can instead be understood as 
systematic reactions to developments elsewhere in the economy. 
 
We provide a methodology for decomposing these reactions.  We have shown that the interest 
rate changes were not driven by inflation surprises directly. Instead, there was some additional 
upward pressure on interest rates of between 10 and 20 basis points in 2000 via monetary 
variables, turning to a more neutral to negative pressure in 2001.  Further,  there was some 
additional upward pressure on interest rates from real variables at the very beginning in 2001, 
but mostly downward pressure ever since of somewhere between -10 and -30 basis points. 
The  pressure  from monetary and real variables may have  been excerted through their 
inflationary consequences, about which the Fed might have ultimately been concerned about: 
whether this is so or whether the Fed is reacting for other reasons to these news cannot be 
deduced here. 
 
Finally, we argue against the usefulness of constant-interest-rate projections.  E.g., the 
constant-interest-rate projections provided towards the end of this paper say, that interest rates 
should not have remained at 6.5% for 2001 and 2002 because otherwise the US might 
experience a deflation of up to minus 10%.  This is like saying that when driving a car, one 
should not follow a straight line for another mile or two, after the road has taken a turn: 
correct advice, but not particularly useful.  Further, to interpret the constant-interest-rates 
projection requires considerable mental discipline and awareness that these projections 
actually show a dramatic change in policy, interpreted by agents as a highly unlikely sequence 
of dramatically large policy shocks.  In sum, constant-interest-rate projections are of limited 
informational value, can be highly misleading and should be replaced by the kind of "on-the-
equilibrium" zero-shock-to-monetary-policy projections which have been provided in the first 
parts of this paper. 
 
 
 
References 
 
Alesina, Alberto F., Olivier J. Blanchard, Jordi Gali, Francesco Giavazzi and Harald Uhlig, 
"Definining a Macroeconomic Framework for the Euro Area, Monitoring the European 
Central Bank 3: Update", September 2001 
 
Bernanke, Ben S. and Ilian Mihov, "Measuring monetary policy," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics; 113(3), August 1998, pages 869-902. 
 
Canova, Fabio and Gianni de Nicolo, "Monetary disturbances atter for business fluctuations in 
the G-7", Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance 
Discussion Paper no. 600, Feb. 2000. 
 
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum and Charles L. Evans, "Monetary policy shocks: 
what have we learned and to what end?", chapter 2 in Taylor and Woodford, eds., Handbook 
of Macroeconomics, vol. 1A, Elsevier 1999. 
 
Cochrane, John H., "Permanent and transitory components of GNP and stock prices", 
Quarterly Journal of Economics; 109(1), February 1994, pages 241-65. 
 
Faust, Jon, "The Robustness of Identified VAR Conclusions about Money," Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy; 49(0), December 1998, pages 207-44. 
 
Favero, Carlo, Applied Macroeconometrics, Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 
Leeper, Eric M., Christopher A. Sims and Tao Zha, "What Does Monetary Policy Do?" 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; 0(2), 1996, pages 1-63. 
 
Leeper, Eric M. and Tao Zha, "Empirical Analysis of Policy Interventions," draft, Indiana 
University, Department of Economics, 2001. 
 
Ljungqvist, Lars and Thomas J. Sargent, Recursive Macroeconomic Theory, MIT Press, 2000. 
 
Orphanides, Athanasios, "Monetary Policy Rules Based on Real-Time Data", American 
Economic Review, September 2001, 963-985. 
 
Sargent, Thomas J., The conquest of American inflation, Princeton University Press, 1999. 
 
Sims, Christopher A. (1992), ``Interpreting the Macroeconomic Time Series Facts: 
the Effects of monetary policy,'' European Economic Review, vol. 36, 1992, 975-1011. 
 
Sims, Christopher A. and Tao Zha (1998), "Bayesian Methods for Dynamic Multivariate 
Models",  International Economic Review; 39(4), November 1998, pages 949-68.+ 
 
Sims, Christopher A. and Tao Zha (1998), "Does monetary policy generate recessions?", 
working paper 98-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. 
 
Uhlig, Harald (1999), "What are the results of monetary policy shocks on output?  Results 
from an agnostic identification procedure", CEPR Discussion Paper 2137 
